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Abstract 
We examined the relative frequency of social, counterfactual, past-temporal, and future-temporal 
comparison in daily life using an experience-sampling method, in which participants were 
randomly prompted to record thought samples using palmtop computers carried for two weeks.  
Comparative thought accounted for 12% of all thoughts, and all four comparison types occurred 
with equivalent frequency.  Comparisons may be either fact-based (i.e., based on actuality, as in 
social and past-temporal comparison) or simulation-based (i.e., based on imagination, as in 
counterfactual and future-temporal comparison).  Because the latter are more “unbounded,” and 
because greater perceived opportunity invites greater self-improvement, we predicted and found 
that counterfactual and future-temporal comparison were more likely to be upward (vs. 
downward) than social and past-temporal comparison.  All comparison types focused on 
approach more than avoidance motives, except for counterfactuals, which showed equivalent 
focus on both.  These findings reveal the prominence of comparative thought in daily life, and 
underscore the value an integrative theory that describes social, counterfactual, or temporal 
comparison using a common theoretical platform. 
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Dare to Compare:  
Fact-Based versus Simulation-Based Comparison in Daily Life 
 
People compare themselves to numerous benchmarks, from other people (social 
comparison), to imaginings of what might have been (counterfactual comparison), and to past or 
future circumstances (temporal comparison).  How common are comparisons, and what 
functions do they serve in daily life?  Established theory presumes that comparisons are frequent 
(e.g., Festinger, 1954; Mussweiler, 2003; Taylor & Brown, 1988), yet only a few studies have 
examined their daily occurrence (e.g., Wheeler & Miyake, 1992), and none have contrasted all of 
social, counterfactual, and temporal comparison simultaneously.  The present research examined 
these various kinds of comparisons in daily life using the experience sampling technique (e.g., 
Scollon, Kim-Prieto, & Diener, 2003), in which participants carried palm-style computing 
devices that prompted them to record thought samples at random times over a two-week period. 
Of key importance was direction of comparison (i.e., upward or downward), which 
previous theory has linked to specific psychological functions, such as self-improvement 
(planning and acting to achieve better outcomes) versus affect-regulation (reconstruing 
circumstances so as to feel better).  In the social comparison literature, direction of comparison 
distinguishes between comparisons to a superior versus inferior other person (e.g., Suls & 
Wheeler, 2000); in the counterfactual literature, to superior versus inferior alternative 
circumstances (e.g., Roese, 1997); and in the temporal comparison literature, to a superior or 
inferior past (or future) self (e.g., Wilson & Ross, 2000).  Upward comparisons, by suggesting 
insights into personal betterment, generally serve a self-improvement function, whereas 
downward comparisons, which make reality seem more favorable by contrast, may serve 
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primarily an affect-regulation function (Brickman & Bulman, 1977; Taylor & Brown, 1988; 
Wills, 1981).  Although several moderators have been noted (e.g., Buunk et al., 1990; Markman 
& McMullen, 2003; Taylor & Lobel, 1989), the connection between direction of comparison and 
specific psychological functions has informed decades of research.  Despite this attention, key 
questions remain:  how often do upward and downward comparisons occur in daily life, and do 
these frequencies vary as a function of the type of comparison? 
There are compelling theoretical reasons to expect that upward versus downward 
comparisons differ among the comparison types.  We suggest that the referents that define these 
kinds of comparisons confer differences in their tendency to take an upward versus downward 
form.  Specifically, whether the comparisons are primarily fact-based versus simulation-based 
may moderate their direction of comparison.  A fact-based judgment is one that rests largely on 
known or assumed factual information, for example observations of real people and real events.  
Social and past-temporal comparisons are examples of fact-based judgment, in the sense that 
they focus (for the most part) on information rooted to actual people or events.  By contrast, a 
simulation-based judgment is one that rests on supposition, conjecture, and imagination (e.g., 
Davies & Stone, 1995; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982).  A simulation may be highly accurate if 
based on accurate knowledge (as in a weather forecast based on reliable temperature and 
pressure measurements), but at root it is a constructed representation.  It does not correspond to 
an actual event that has clearly transpired.  Counterfactual and future-temporal comparisons are 
examples of simulation-based judgments.  They focus respectively on past events that “might 
have been” had some factual aspects been different, and on future events that may (or may not) 
come to be.  Of course, the distinction between fact-based and simulation-based is relative rather 
than absolute.  Sometimes social comparison, for example, involves considerable conjecture 
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(e.g., they may involve an imagined or idealized person), but relatively speaking, social 
comparison on average involves relatively less conjecture than counterfactual or future-temporal 
comparison. 
Fact-based versus simulation-based judgments differ in their boundedness, that is, in the 
basic constraints on how they are conceived.  Fact-based judgments are bounded by reality, 
which imposes specific constraints rooted to what actually has been observed, and what is 
believed to be true.  Simulation-based judgments are less bounded:  the imagination may range 
far and wide over many possibilities.  Thus, whereas comparisons to another person or to a past 
event are limited to what that other person is actually like (“she is outgoing”) and what actually 
happened (“I was inattentive in school”), counterfactual and future-temporal comparisons may 
select from a far wider palette of possibilities (“I might have been attentive, or excited, or 
ambitious”; “she may learn to be generous, become a basketball fan, or volunteer her spare time 
at a homeless shelter”).  Previous theorists have recognized the importance of boundedness in 
different contexts.  For example, Gilovich and Medvec (1995) noted that regrets of inaction 
(which focus on some action that might have been performed in the past, i.e., an “additive” 
counterfactual) are less bounded than regrets of action (which focus on actions that were in fact 
performed, but perhaps should not have been, i.e., a “subtractive” counterfactual).  Whereas the 
latter are constrained by actuality, the “consequences of inactions are … potentially infinite:  
they are bounded only by one’s imagination” (p. 390).  Markman et al. (2007) demonstrated that 
regrets of inaction (additive counterfactuals) promote a more expansive processing style, marked 
by wider conceptual attention and greater creativity.  
Gilovich and Medvec (1995) pointed out further that with decreased boundedness comes 
greater recognition of opportunity and possibility, which other research has shown to be linked to 
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self-improvement and performance facilitation.  Simply put, individuals are more likely to 
engage in self-improvement actions when they perceive their circumstances to be modifiable 
(Gilbert & Ebert, 2002; Roese & Summerville, 2005).  A wide range of separate research has 
shown that greater perceptions of control, opportunity, or simple changeability elicit more 
action-oriented thoughts, greater effort and persistence, and better performance (e.g., Markman 
et al., 1993; Testa & Major, 1991).  For example, individuals who believe in the changeability of 
their own skills performed better than those who believed that these same skills were invariant 
(e.g., Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Hong et al., 1999).  In the counterfactual literature, participants 
induced to focus on regrets of inaction (which are less bounded) than regrets of action 
subsequently showed greater performance improvements (Roese, 1994).  The regulatory focus 
literature has also shown that wider consideration of possibilities elicits better performance.  That 
is, a promotion focus involves consideration of a wider range of information than prevention 
focus (Forster & Higgins, 2005), and overall promotion focus induces better performance (via 
task persistence) than prevention focus (e.g., Forster et al., 1998; Liberman et al., 1999).  
These various theoretical strands converge on the prediction that simulation-based 
comparisons, because they are less conceptually bounded than fact-based comparisons, will more 
often connect to self-improvement.  If self-improvement is more likely to involve upward than 
downward comparison, then simulation-based comparisons (counterfactual and future-temporal) 
should be more likely to take the upward direction of comparison than fact-based comparisons 
(social and past-temporal).  Although no previous research has simultaneously examined social, 
counterfactual, past-temporal, and future-temporal comparisons appear in daily life, past research 
is partly consistent with this prediction.  Wheeler and Miyake’s (1992) diary study indicated that 
for social comparison, downward comparison was more likely than upward comparison.  Wilson 
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and Ross (2000) examined retrospective reports of frequency of comparative thought, and found 
that future-temporal comparisons were most likely to be upward, past-temporal comparisons 
were least likely to be upward, with social comparisons falling in between.  Roese and Hur 
(1997) found that spontaneously recorded counterfactual comparisons following performance 
feedback were mostly upward rather than downward. 
The construct of boundedness also yields predictions about the extent to which these 
different comparison types emphasize approach versus avoidance motives.  Approach motives 
center on acquisition of desired ends, whereas avoidance motives center on prevention of 
undesired ends.  Past research has already revealed a simple association between direction of 
comparison and motives, such that upward comparisons connect to approach and downward 
comparisons connect to avoidance motives (in counterfactual comparison: Hur, 2001; in social 
comparison: Lockwood et al., 2002).  Thus, we expected to see this same basic pattern across all 
comparison types.  But might approach and avoidance motives differ in their importance within 
the comparison types?  Two competing predictions seemed plausible.  First, some have argued 
that approach motives are, by definition, less bounded than avoidance motives (Forster & 
Higgins, 2005; Liberman et al., 2001).  That is, approach motives are more likely to involve 
maximization, or focusing on getting the best that is possible, whereas avoidance motives are 
more likely to be minimal, in the sense of doing just enough to keep things as they are (i.e., to 
prevent things from getting worse; Pennington & Roese, 2003).  In this view, what matters most 
is the structural fit between boundedness and motive.  Accordingly, the simulation-based 
comparisons (low boundedness) may be more likely to emphasize approach (also low 
boundedness) than avoidance, relative to the fact-based comparisons.  The second possibility is 
that the simulation-based comparisons, simply by virtue of their less bounded nature, might 
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afford greater flexibility to serve both (or either) of approach and avoidance goals equivalently.  
The present research was able to test these competing predictions by assessing the degree of 
association between comparison type and ratings of approach versus avoidance motives. 
We also tested whether different comparison types might be associated with differing 
degrees of affect, although we had no theoretical reason to expect such a difference.  A further 
question was whether direction of comparison would be associated with affect, as past research 
has indicated that affect is both a cause as well as consequence of upward versus downward 
comparison.  Upward more than downward comparison may elicit negative affect by way of a 
contrast effect, and negative affect may stimulate self-improvement cognitions in general, with 
upward comparison as one such example (e.g., Roese, 1997; Wheeler & Miyake, 1992).  At the 
same time, other research has shown that expectation of future performance opportunities shield 
individuals from the negative affective consequences of upward comparison (Boninger et al., 
1994).  Thus, to the extent that individuals in our study enjoy a generally optimistic orientation 
embodying expectations of future opportunity, the association between direction of comparison 
and affect might be weakened.  Nevertheless, no prior research has examined the affect 
associations involved in direction of comparison simultaneously in social, counterfactual, and 
temporal comparison. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
 Thirty-four paid participants (15 women, age M = 22.3 yrs) were recruited by flyers 
posted in campus locations during summer semesters.   Prior to receiving the palmtop computer, 
participants completed a computerized tutorial of definitions and examples used within survey 
questions, and were tested to ensure correct usage of the classification.  Participants repeated this 
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training test until they correctly classified all 4 of the example thoughts provided (e.g., 
classifying "If I'd worn running shoes, I wouldn't have gotten a blister yesterday" as a 
comparison focused on "what might have been.”)  Participants were also trained to record their 
responses to the multiple-choice and sliding-scale questionnaire items.  Participants selected one 
of three 10-hr daily windows during which the palmtop computer would randomly signal thought 
sampling.  Data were collected daily for 14 days using Palm Zire palmtop computers running 
iESP software.  Participants were signaled seven times during the daily 10-hr window selected, 
with alerts occurring every 1-2 hrs.  Participants had 10 mins to respond to the alarm (which 
beeped continuously until termination) and 2 mins to respond to each question before the 
computer recorded a missed trial and entered sleep mode; trials in which any question went 
unanswered were classified as “missed” (19.8% of trials).   Participants returned to the lab after 1 
week so that the palmtop computer could be checked and data backed up, and were asked about 
any problems they were experiencing.  Although minor technical issues were noted (e.g., 
forgetting how to silence or resume the alarm, one instance of battery failure), no participant 
reported significant difficulty with the requirements of the study or in classifying their thoughts 
either during this session or at the end of the two weeks. 
 In each trial, thought classification proceeded using a hierarchical questionnaire (see 
Figure 1). Due to software constraints, we could not collect free response thought listings, but 
only the responses to multiple-choice questions classifying the thoughts.  Participants initially 
categorized their thoughts as comparison, fact, opinion, or other.  They then further categorized 
the thought using Level 2 descriptors unique to each Level 1 category.  Results are presented 
only for thoughts categorized as “comparison” at Level 1.  For thoughts classified as 
comparisons, the surveys used the prompt "Right now, I am comparing myself to…" with the 
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response options   “other people” (i.e., social comparison),  “what might have been” (i.e., 
counterfactual comparison), or “another point in time” (i.e. temporal comparison).  Participants 
selecting "another point in time" further indicated whether they were comparing themselves to 
the past or future.  Participants used a sliding scale to rate the direction of comparison (upward 
vs. downward); these ratings were transformed to a -5 to 5 scale.  
Participants also used sliding scales to rate their current emotional and motivational state.  
Participants indicated their level of agreement with the statements "Right now, I am focused on 
achieving positive outcomes" (i.e., approach motivation) and "Right now, I am focused on 
avoiding negative outcomes" (i.e., avoidance motivation); these ratings were transformed to a 0 
to 10 scale.  Mood was assessed with the item "Right now, I am feeling:" with anchors "Bad" 
and "Good"; these ratings were transformed to a -5 to 5 scale. 
Results 
 Of all thoughts sampled, 12.2% were comparative (range: 0 – 36.8%, SD = 7.98).  Of 
these, we were interested only in self-focused comparisons (57.8% of all comparisons, hence 
7.1% of all thoughts sampled).  Analyses reported below focused on only on those self-focused 
comparisons. 
Of key interest, the four kinds of comparisons occurred with roughly equivalent 
frequency:   social – 24.2%; counterfactual – 25.5%; past-temporal – 19.4%; future-temporal – 
30.9%.  These proportions did not differ statistically (χ2(3) = 4.43, p > .10), with the exception 
that past-temporal comparisons were less frequent than future-temporal comparisons (χ2(1) = 
4.41, p < .05).  
We next examined whether direction of comparison differed across comparison type (see 
Figure 2).  To account for the non-independent nature of our observations, we used a hierarchical 
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regression approach, nesting trials within participants.  To test the primary hypothesis that 
simulation-based versus fact-based comparisons would differ in direction of comparison, we 
created a dummy variable that captured this distinction.  In a hierarchical regression predicting 
direction from this dummy variable, we indeed found that simulation-based comparisons were 
overall more upward in direction than fact-based comparisons, t(31) = 3.11, p = .004, d = 1.12. 
Looking more specifically at each comparison, we found that the two simulation-based 
comparison (counterfactual and future-temporal) did not differ from each other (Ms = 2.28 vs. 
2.51), t(25) = 0.002, p = .99, d = 0.001.  Further, the two fact-based judgments (social and past-
temporal comparison) also did not differ from each other (Ms = 0.71 vs. 1.59), t(26) = 1.61, p = 
.12, d = 0 .63.  Future-temporal comparisons were significantly more upward than both social 
(t(30) = 3.38, p = .002, d = 1.23) and past-temporal comparisons (t(26) = 2.15, p = .04, d =  
0.84).  Counterfactual comparisons only marginally exceeded social comparisons (t(28) = 1.93, p 
= .06, d = 0.73), and did not differ from past-temporal comparisons (t(24) = 1.36, p = .18, d = 
0.56).   
The percentages of thoughts that exceeded the scale midpoint provided an additional 
means of capturing the relative frequency of upward versus downward comparisons.  Using this 
index, a similar pattern as above was evident:  80% of counterfactual and as well as of future-
temporal comparisons were upward, compared to 69% of past-temporal and 55% of social 
comparisons.  We calculated the percentage of all simulation-based and all fact-based 
comparisons which exceeded the scale midpoint within each participant (80% vs. 61%, 
respectively), and then used a hierarchical approach, nesting these two types within each 
participant.  Because not every participant made both types of comparisons, this test was more 
appropriate than a paired-sample t-test, which would have contained a large number of missing 
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cells. Consistent with the above analyses, we again found that simulation-based comparisons had 
a greater percentage of upward comparisons relative to fact-based comparisons, t(56) = 2.10, p = 
.04, d = 0.56.  
We next examined how direction of comparison was related to motives across and within 
the four comparison types using hierarchical linear regression. A hierarchical model nesting 
trials within participants was created in which ratings of approach and avoidance were regressed 
onto ratings of direction.  To begin with, approach motives were rated higher overall than 
avoidance motives, t(32) = 4.75, p < .001, d = 1.68.  Further, direction of comparison was 
associated overall with approach, such that comparisons that were relatively more upward were 
accompanied by greater approach motives, γs = .23, t(31) = 3.89, p = .001, d = 1.40.  At the same 
time, direction of comparison was unrelated to avoidance motives, γ = .04, t(31) = 0.39, p = .70, 
d = 0.14.   
Looking next to associations within each comparison type, we found that social 
comparisons focused more on approach than avoidance (Ms = 6.95 vs. 4.91), t(20) = 3.22, p = 
.005, d = 1.44.  The same pattern was evident in future-temporal comparisons (Ms = 8.40 vs. 
6.25), t(19) = 3.74, p = .002, d = 1.72.  Past-temporal comparisons also showed this pattern (Ms 
= 7.68 vs. 6.83), although this effect was weaker, t(17) = 1.98, p = .06, d = 0.96.  By contrast, 
counterfactual thoughts emphasized approach and avoidance equivalently (Ms = 7.93 vs. 7.37), 
t(18) = 1.63, p = .12, d = 0.77.  These means are presented in Figure 3. 
In a hierarchical regression predicting mood from direction across all comparisons, 
direction of comparison was positively correlated with mood, γ = .22, t(31) = 2.43, p = .02, d = 
0.87.  In other words, the greater the degree of upward comparison, the more positive the affect 
reported.  Looking closer to the types of comparison, the pattern was evident only in 
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counterfactual and past-temporal comparisons (γs = .31, .28) but not social or future-temporal 
comparisons (γs = .04, .04).  Mood ratings exceeded the scale midpoint (and thus indicated an 
overall degree of happiness) within all comparison types (all ps < .01).  Further, of these 4 
means, only social and future-temporal comparisons differed significantly (Ms = 1.09 vs. 2.24), 
t(31) = 2.67, p = .01, d = 0.96.  Overall, then, we observed no systematic relation between mood 
and boundedness.  The association between upward comparison and positive affect was 
intriguing and to an extent surprising, and we return to it in the discussion below. 
 
Discussion 
 The present research employed an experience-sampling approach to examine the daily 
frequencies of various kinds of comparative judgment:  social, counterfactual, past-temporal, and 
future-temporal.  Of the thoughts sampled, 12% were comparative, which is a remarkably large 
proportion given the sheer variety of mental experience.  Further, self-focused comparisons, 
which are the sort of comparison that have garnered the most theoretical attention in social 
psychology, accounted for 7.1% of all thoughts sampled.  Comparative thought may therefore be 
said to occupy a significant place in the mental landscape of daily life, thus justifying the 
theoretical attention such thought processes have garnered in recent decades.   
 Strikingly, these comparisons were nearly evenly split among the four types of 
comparison that we examined.  Previous research has been unclear on this point.  Suls and 
Mullen (1982), for example, suggested that social comparison predominates over temporal 
comparison, yet later research by Wilson and Ross (2000) demonstrated the reverse.  No similar 
research has examined counterfactual comparison alongside social and temporal comparison.  
The present research, by contrast, reveals that in everyday life, none of social, counterfactual, or 
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temporal comparison enjoys a privileged position.  This simple observation is important for 
current theory in that it underscores the value of integrative approaches, such as that taken by 
Markman and McMullen (2003) in their reflection-evaluation model.  These authors were the 
first to integrate across the different kinds of comparisons using a common theoretical platform, 
rather than relying on separate theories for each of social, counterfactual, or temporal 
comparison.   
The key focus of the present research was whether direction of comparison differed 
across the different kinds of comparisons in daily life.  We noted that a key difference between 
types of comparison is whether they are primarily fact-based versus simulation-based; that is, 
whether they are constructed from information based on actual people or events, or on imagined 
supposition.  Social and past-temporal comparisons are examples of fact-based judgment, 
whereas counterfactual and future-temporal comparisons are examples of simulation-based 
judgments.  Fact-based judgments are bounded by the facts at hand, whereas simulation-based 
judgments less bounded, and hence may embrace information from a far broader range of 
possibilities.  As Gilovich and Medvec (1995) noted, simulation-based judgment is limited only 
by the bounds of the imagination.  Other theory and research suggests that the less the 
boundedness of the representation, the greater the association with self-improvement cognitions 
and performance improvement (Forster et al., 1998; Gilbert & Ebert, 2002; Hong et al., 1999; 
Liberman et al., 1999; Markman et al., 1993, 2007; Testa & Major, 1990; Roese & Summerville, 
2005).  Tying these strands together, we predicted that simulation-based judgments (low 
boundedness) would be more likely to take the upward than downward direction of comparison 
(which previous theory has connected directly to self-improvement, Brickman & Bulman, 1977; 
Wills, 1981).   
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We indeed found that in everyday life, the simulation-based comparisons (counterfactual 
and future-temporal) were more likely to be upward than the fact-based comparisons (social and 
past-temporal).  Even though social comparison involved the lowest level of upward comparison, 
these upward thoughts were roughly equivalent in frequency to downward thoughts.  This result 
differs from Wheeler and Myake (1992), who reported that downward outnumbered upward 
thoughts in social comparison, but it is consistent with the result reported by Wilson and Ross 
(2000).  The present findings thus make an important new contribution to an integrated 
theoretical approach to comparative thought:  it is counterfactual and future-temporal 
comparison (simulation-based judgments) that are most likely to focus on self-improvement, and 
hence the regulation of ongoing behavior.  Social and past-temporal comparison (fact-based 
judgments) may sometimes connect to self-improvement, but they are perhaps more likely to be 
directed to other sorts of motives, such as affect regulation.  At the same time, it is important to 
note that there is not a perfect, one-to-one matching between direction of comparison and 
motive.  For example, an upward counterfactual may be motivated by a desire to make sense of 
one’s experiences rather than by self-improvement, and future-temporal comparison may reflect 
an idle daydream rather than a well-reasoned intention.  Future research that examines more 
directly the various functions served by upward and downward comparison in daily life will 
prove highly informative. 
 In addition to their different patterns of direction of comparison, the four kinds of 
comparison differed in the extent to which they emphasized approach versus avoidance motives.  
Social, past-temporal, and future-temporal comparison focused by a wide margin on approach 
over avoidance, whereas counterfactual comparison focused equally on approach and avoidance.  
This finding revealed yet another important difference between types of comparative judgment:  
Comparison in Daily Life  - 16 
all but counterfactuals emphasized moving forward toward ideal end-states.  Past research has 
shown a connection between upward comparison and approach motives, and downward 
comparison and avoidance motives, but this research was situated specifically within either 
social comparison (Lockwood et al., 2002) or counterfactual comparison (Hur, 2001). Our 
research, by contrast, found only the association between upward comparison and approach 
motives, yet nevertheless discovered it to be a pattern common to all the comparisons as they 
unfold in daily life.  Thus, there appears to be a basic psychological connection between focus on 
an alternative that is better than the current one and a motivational emphasis on achieving a 
desired, ideal state. 
The boundedness conception suggested two further possible relations between the various 
comparison types and approach versus avoidance motives: first, simulation-based comparisons 
(low boundedness) may be more likely to emphasize approach (also low boundedness) than 
avoidance, relative to the fact-based comparisons, and second, simulation-based comparisons, 
simply by virtue of their less bounded nature, might afford greater flexibility to serve both (or 
either) of approach and avoidance goals equivalently.  The first idea was supported by a weak 
tendency for simulation-based comparisons to yield higher approach ratings than fact-based 
comparisons.  The second possibility was not confirmed:  only counterfactual comparisons 
seemed to involve the inherent flexibility to embrace approach and avoidance equivalently.  This 
latter finding is interesting, in that Mandel and Lehman (1996) suggested that counterfactuals are 
predominantly avoidance-focused.  Our findings qualify their assertion, suggesting that in 
everyday life, counterfactual comparisons are more avoidance-focused relative to other forms of 
comparative judgment.   
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 Surprisingly, affect was found to be related to direction of comparison in a manner 
different from much previous research, such that upward comparison was associated with more 
positive affect.  This relation was significant only in comparisons focusing on the past 
(counterfactual and past-temporal), with the other comparisons showing a null relation.  Of 
course, given the correlational nature of our data, it is impossible to say whether affect was cause 
or consequence of direction of comparison.  However, one intriguing possibility is that an 
ongoing focus on future possibilities and opportunities might serve to weaken the link between 
affect and direction of comparison.  For example, Boninger, Gleicher, and Strathman (1994) 
reported that among participants who were likely to focus on the future and on the benefits of 
learning from mistakes, the typically observed negative affective consequences of upward 
counterfactual comparison was quashed, relative to those participants less likely to focus on 
“what can be done in the future.”  Similarly, McMullen and Markman (2002) found that upward 
counterfactual comparisons corresponded to more positive affect (an assimilation effect) when a 
situation remained open (rather than closed) to future modification, such as at halftime in a 
basketball game.  Perhaps among our young participants, life itself may be metaphorically at 
half-time.  By sampling comparative thought across a variety of daily activities, we may have 
captured more of this opportunity orientation, and perhaps revealed that affective assimilation 
rather than contrast effects are more common than has previously been observable using 
laboratory tasks. 
Another interpretation of the association of affect and direction might be made, given the 
correlational nature of our measurement.  Specifically, affect regulation is particularly necessary 
in the face of increasingly negative affect.  Because participants reported the thought at the 
instant of the trial, the affective impact of the comparison might not yet have occurred, and we 
Comparison in Daily Life  - 18 
may have measured the affective state preceding and immediately surrounding the comparative 
thought, rather than the affective consequences.  The correlation could thus indicate that negative 
affect triggered downward comparisons, which would be consistent with earlier research on 
affect repair (e.g. Aspinwall & Taylor, 1993; Gibbons, 1986; Wills, 1981).  Research designed to 
trace the time course of affect regulation via strategic generation of comparative thoughts could 
confirm the plausibility of this interpretation.  
 The present research provided a unique portrait of the daily frequency of different forms 
of comparative judgment and their directions of comparison.  Like any portrait, this picture 
depends on the subjects tested (college students), hence we encourage validation of these results 
in a more diverse sample.  In updating the conclusions of past research, the present research 
nevertheless provides new evidence that bolsters established theory linking direction of 
comparison to psychological functions (Brickman & Bulman, 1977; Taylor & Brown, 1988; 
Wills, 1981; Wood et al., 2000), yet also extends this theory by showing additionally that 
particular kinds of comparative judgment are, overall, differentially associated with particular 
functions.  By taking into account basic differences in the form of the comparison, i.e., between 
fact-based and simulation-based comparison, we observed a general pattern that low 
boundedness points to upward comparison.  Counterfactual and future-temporal comparisons 
mainly take the upward direction of comparison, whereas social and past-temporal are more 
likely to embody either of upward or downward comparison.   
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Figure 1 




My thoughts right now  
focus on: 
Facts or questions Opinions and evaluations Comparisons Other 
This comparison involves  
me/my current situation. 
YES NO 
I am comparing myself to: 
Other people What might have been Another point in time. 
I am comparing myself to: 
The past The future 
Compared to myself/my  
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Figure 2 
Direction of comparison within each comparison type 
 
Note.  Positive values indicate greater focus on upward comparison, whereas negative values 
indicate greater focus on downward comparison.  Scale range is from -5 to 5. 
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Figure 3 
Approach and avoidance motivation for comparison types 
 
 
Note.  Greater values indicate greater emphasis on approach or avoidance motives.  Scale range 
is 1-10. 
 
 
 
 
